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JURISDICTION 
 
Originally brought before the Utah Supreme Court under Utah Code Annotated 
(“UCA”) § 78A-3-102(3)(j), this matter has been poured over by the Supreme Court to 
the Court of Appeals pursuant to UCA § 78A-3-102(4). The Court of Appeals, of course, 
has jurisdiction over matters thus transferred. UCA § 78A-4-103(2)(j). 
STANDARDS OF REVIEW & ISSUES  
 
ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW ON APPEAL: “ ‘When a lower court reviews an order of an 
administrative agency and we exercise appellate review of the lower court's judgment, we 
act as if we were reviewing the administrative agency decision directly’ and ‘do not 
defer, or accord a presumption of correctness, to the lower court’s decision.’ ” Save Our 
Canyons v. Board of Adjustment of Salt Lake County, 2005 UT App 285, at ¶12, 116 
P.3d 978, (quoting Carrier v. Salt Lake County, 2004 UT 98, ¶ 17, 104 P.3d 1208 
(citations omitted)).  
ISSUES: Whether the District Court properly granted Pacific summary and 
declaratory judgment on its bona-fide purchaser and PUD-invalidity claims— 
1. Despite Pacific’s improper inclusion in a Petition for Review of a cause of 
action beyond the scope of the permitted review (Preserved: R. 203–07). 
A. Relevant Law:  UCA § 10-9a-801; UCA § 78B-6-405; and URCP 56. 
B. Standard of Review:  Under UCA § 10-9a-801(3)(a), the Court must 
“presume that [the City’s] decision … is valid; and determine only whether or not 
the decision … is arbitrary, capricious, or illegal.” See Carrier v. Salt Lake County, 
2004 UT 98, ¶26, 104 P.3d 1208 (citing Patterson v. Utah County Bd. of 
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Adjustment, 893 P.2d 602, 603-04 (Utah Ct. App. 1995). 
2. Despite its failure to raise before the Grantsville City Council its bona-fide 
purchaser and PUD-invalidity claims (Preserved: R. 207–08). 
A. Relevant Law:  UCA § 10-9a-701(4)(c); and Grantsville Land Use 
Development and Management Code (the “Grantsville Code” or “City Code”) § 
3.22: “In making an appeal, an adversely affected party shall present to the appeal 
authority every theory of relief that it can raise in district court.” 
B. Standard of Review:  This issue falls within the summary-judgment 
standard of review cited above. 
3. Based upon evidence outside the record, despite Utah law’s proscription 
against considering or even receiving such evidence (Preserved: R. 207–08). 
A. Relevant Law:  UCA § 10-9a-801 
B. Standard of Review:  District court review is limited to the record 
provided by the [administrative body] .... The court may not accept or consider any 
evidence outside th[at] … record ....’” Patterson v. Utah County Bd. of Adjustment, 
893 P.2d 602, 605 (Utah Ct. App. 1995) (quoting Utah Code Ann. § 17-27-
708(5)(a) (1991), which is substantially similar to Utah Code Ann. § 10-9a-801(8)) 
(2008). 
4. On its claim to being a bona-fide purchaser despite its having had both 
record and inquiry notice of the restrictions on development applicable to the PUD 
(Preserved: R. 205–07). 
A. Relevant Law: UCA § 57-3-103; UCA § 70A-8-302; Salt Lake County 
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v. Metro West Ready Mix, Inc., 2004 UT 23, ¶13, 89 P.3d 155. 
B. Standard of Review:  A “determination of whether … property [has 
been] sold to a bona-fide purchaser or to one with actual or constructive notice … 
involves questions of fact which must be determined by the trial court on remand.”  
Timm v. Dewsnup, 921 P.2d 1381, 1393 (Utah 1996). 
5. Based on Pacific’s incorrect interpretation of Grantsville City’s Land Use 
Code § 12.4(5) (Preserved: R. 204–05). 
A. Relevant Law:  Grantsville Land Use Development and Management 
Code (the “Grantsville Code” or “City Code”) § 12.4(5): “No planned unit 
development permit shall be valid for a period longer than one year unless a 
building permit has been issued, construction has actually begun within that period 
and construction has been diligently pursued.” 
B. Standard of Review:  Utah appellate courts “interpret municipal and 
county ordinances and resolutions according to our well-settled rules of statutory 
interpretation and construction. ‘When interpreting statutes, we determine the 
statute’s meaning by first looking to the statute’s plain language, and give effect to 
the plain language unless the language is ambiguous.’ ” Pinetree Associates v. 
Ephraim City, 2003 UT 6, ¶13, 67 P.3d 462 (quoting Blackner v. Dep't of Transp., 
2002 UT 44, ¶12, 48 P.3d 949) (further citations and quotations omitted). 
STANDARDS OF REVIEW:   
All of the issues before the Court derive, as set forth above, from the District 
Court’s grant of Pacific’s motion for summary judgment (URCP 56) and declaratory 
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judgment (UCA § 78B-6-401 et seq. (formerly UCA Chap. 78-33)). The appellate courts 
review a “trial court’s decision to grant summary judgment for correctness, ‘granting no 
deference to the trial court’s determination.’” Granite Credit Union v. Remick, 2006 UT 
App 115, ¶7, 133 P.3d 440 (quoting Brown v. Wanlass, 2001 UT App 30, ¶4, 18 P.3d 
1137), and viewing the facts and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in the light 
most favorable to the nonmoving party. Carrier v. Salt Lake County, 2004 UT 98, ¶3, 104 
P.3d 1208. “However, ‘[b]ecause summary judgment, by definition, does not resolve 
factual issues, a challenge for summary judgment presents for review only questions of 
law.’” Kelly v. Hard Money Funding, Inc., 2004 UT App 44, ¶13, 87 P.3d 734 (quoting 
Dikeou v. Osborn, 881 P.2d 943, 945 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). 
The standard used in the review of a district court’s legal conclusions vis-à-vis entry 
of a declaratory judgment “is the same standard used in reviewing a summary judgment. 
That is, … correctness,” Board of Educ. of Alpine Dist. v. Ward, 1999 UT 17, ¶8, 974 
P.2d 824 (citing Camp v. Office of Recovery Services, 779 P.2d 242, 244 (Utah Ct. App. 
1989)), while “the trial court’s decision to either grant or deny declaratory relief … [is 
reviewed] for an abuse of discretion,” Boyle v. National Union Fire Ins. Co., 866 P.2d 
595, 598 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). 
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS 
 
Set Forth in Full in the Attached Addendum, at Tab A 
 
— UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE: Rule 56(c)  
 
— UTAH CODE ANNOTATED: UCA § 10-9a-801 UCA § 70A-8-302 
 UCA § 10-9a-701 UCA § 57-3-103 UCA § 78B-6-401 
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— GRANTSVILLE LAND USE MANAGEMENT & DEVELOPMENT CODE: 
§ 3.22 Appeals. § 3.24 Due Process § 7.8 Determination § 12.1 Purpose 
§ 12.2 Authority to Modify Regulations § 12.3 Minimum Area 
§ 12.4 Application Procedure § 12.5 Adjustments To Development Plan. 
 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
 
NATURE OF THE CASE. Grantsville seeks appellate review of the Third District 
Court’s May 20, 2008, Orders granting Pacific West Communities, Inc.’s (“Pacific’s”), 
motions for summary and declaratory judgment.  
COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS & DISPOSITION BELOW. This latest round in 
Grantsville’s dispute with Pacific began with Pacific’s submission of its latest proposal to 
build out Phase 2 of the Country Haven Condominiums with a development, to be called 
“Orchard Park Condo Area,” significantly different from the approved April 1998 plans. 
(R. at 44: Exh. 9, pp. 2–5, 10–12.)  
The Grantsville Planning Commission recommended approval of Pacific’s proposal 
at its January 11, 2007, meeting (R. at 44: Exh. 9, p. 12), but the Grantsville City Council 
denied the proposed plan at its February 21, 2007, meeting (R. at 44: Exh. 5, pp. 13–14). 
Written findings and conclusions were entered on March 7, 2007. (R. at 44: Exh. 2.) 
Pacific filed a Petition for Review in the Third District Court for Tooele County on 
April 6, 2007. (R. at 14.) The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment—
Pacific’s being supplemented, contrary to the prohibition of UCA § 10-9a-801, with the 
Affidavits of Dennis Vanderheiden, Douglas Gibson, and Caleb Roope. (R. at 79–102.) 
The court received the extraneous affidavits and heard argument on the motions on 
February 22, 2008. (R. at 301, pp. 1–122.)  
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The court granted Grantsville’s motion for summary judgment, ruling from the 
bench that “substantial evidence support[ed] the decision of the City.” (R. at 301, pp. 
118–119. A copy of the relevant portion of the February 22, 2008 Hearing Transcript is 
attached in the Addendum at Tab B.) The court thereupon dismissed Pacific’s appeal. (R. 
at 301, p. 119:5–6.) But the court then went on to grant Pacific’s motions for summary 
and declaratory judgment, finding Pacific “a bonafide purchaser … not bound by the 
covenants or restrictions” and the PUD terminated based on Grantsville Code §12.4(5), 
the statute of frauds, and the applicable CC&Rs. (R. at 250 & 301, pp. 119–120.)  
Following an objection, a hearing, and a revised ruling (R. at 265), the 
memorializing Orders were filed on May 20, 2008 (R. at 266–74.  A copy of the 
Declaratory Judgment, dated May 20, 2008, is attached in the Addendum at Tab C, and a 
copy of Order on Cross Motions for Summary Judgment, dated May 20, 2008 is attached 
in the Addendum at Tab D). Grantsville filed its Notice of Appeal on May 23, 2008 (R. at 
275–76), and Pacific filed a cross-appeal on June 17, 2008 (R. at 302–04). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS. On December 17, 1997, pursuant to Chapter 12 of the 
Grantsville City Land Use Management and Development Code (the “City Code”), the 
Grantsville City Council approved a multiphase Planned Unit Development known as 
Country Haven Condominiums (“PUD” or “Country Haven”). (R. at 44: Exh. 12.) 
Chapter 12 authorizes exceptions, for good cause, to the standard subdivision and 
development regulations, and Country Haven was eventually granted limited variances 
for the width of the entrance road, from other street specifications and variances from 
certain building setback and building height requirements. (R. at 44: Exh. 12.) 
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The original developer finalized the engineering drawings for Country Haven on 
November 20, 1997. These were reviewed and approved as part of the approval of 
Country Haven Phase I as well as the concept plan for the development of the Future 
Phases. These include the various specifics of the future phases (R. at 44: Exh. 22): 
a. The Grading Plan for the future phases, describing the elevations of the 
road, buildings, and storm retention areas (R. at 44: Exh. 22, Grading Plan—Sheet 3 
of 10); 
b. The Utility Plan for the future phases (R. at 44: Exh. 22, Utility Plan—
Sheet 4 of 10), including the size and layout of the sewer lines and related fixtures 
and the layout of the culinary water system and fire hydrants; 
c. The Plan and Profile for all of the roads in the project, including detailed 
specifications for the future phases (R. at 44: Exh. 22, Plan and Profile, Sheets 5, 6, 
and 7 of 10); 
d. The Storm Drain details for the entire project, including the future phases 
(R. at 44: Exh. 22, Storm Drain Details, 8 of 10); 
e. The identification of specific building (unit) types (A, C, D, E, and F) for 
each of the residential units in the entire project. Unit types C, D, E, and F are 
located in both Phase 1 and in the Future Phases. Unit type A is located only in the 
Future Phases, and there are only four type A units specified therein. The same 
building (unit) type designations in Phase 1 and the Future Phases are identical in 
size and configuration (R. at 44: Exh 22, Sheets 3 and 4 of 10); 
f. The driveway dimensions for the Project:  Unit types C, D, E, and F 
show driveways that are wide enough to accommodate two cars and two-car 
garages. Unit type A shows a driveway that is only wide enough to accommodate a 
single car and a single-car garage (Id.); 
g. Each building (units) designation—A, C, D, E, and F—consistently 
applies to buildings identical in size and configuration to all other buildings of the 
same designation (E≡E; B≡B; and so forth) within the project, in both Phase 1 and 
the future phases (Id.); 
The final (concept) development plan for the future phases of the Country Haven 
Condominiums was also included as a part of the Final Plat for Phase 1 of the project. 
This plan was specifically approved by the Planning Commission and the City Council, 
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as noted by the signatures of the Chair of the Planning Commission and the signature of 
the Mayor on the Final Recorded Plat. The development plan for the future phases as 
identified on the Final Plat, includes the following (R. at 44: Exh. 23): 
a. A scale drawing showing the exact layout of the future phases including 
the roads, buildings, storm retention areas and a sports court area. 
b. The location and scale drawing of 23 buildings with 63 residential units 
in future phases. 
c. The identification of specific building (residential unit) types with the 
designations of A, C, D, E, and F.   
d. Scale drawings of the residential units in Phase 1 and the future phases, 
which are identical in size and configuration. 
e. Driveway dimensions for all building (unit) types A, C, D, E and F, 
which show that are wide enough to accommodate two cars side by side and two car 
garages. Unit type A shows a driveway that is only wide enough to accommodate a 
single car and single car garage.  
(Id.). 
The Preliminary Plans submitted by the developer and approved by the City (R. at 
44: Exh. 22), also show the same detail for the completion of the future phases as it does 
for the completion of Phase 1. The “Grading Plan,” for the future phases, lists the 
elevations of the roads, buildings, and storm retention areas and identifies flow directions 
and the exact location and elevations of storm drain lines (Id. at Sheet 3 of 10). The 
“Utility Plan” for the future phases, includes the size and layout of the sewer and 
waterlines, manholes, valves and fire hydrants (Id. at Sheet 4 of 10). The “Plan and 
Profile” for all of the roads in the project, includes detailed specifications for the future 
phases (Id. at Sheets 6 and 7 of 10). The “Storm Drain” details for the entire project, 
including the future phases are also included in the preliminary plans. (Id. at Sheet 8 of 
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10). 
Based upon these detailed plans for the entire project, the developer’s only real 
decision was how it would phase the balance of the project and then obtain approval of 
the City to record that phase or request changes to development plan in compliance with 
Section 12-5 of the Land Use Code. The developer on August 14, 1997 indicated that the 
project would be completed in six phases (R. at 44: Exh. 16, p. 1). 
On the final approved plat, the building (unit) types for Phase 1 were crossed out 
and unit numbers were inserted at the request of the Tooele County Recorder, so that 
each of the units could be conveyed by a specific Unit Number (R. at 44: Exh. 23). The 
Preliminary Plan and Final Plat submitted by Pacific’s predecessor and that were 
approved by the City, clearly refer to and identify how the future phases of the project 
would be built, as was required by the City’s Land Use Code and as a condition for 
approval of the first phase (R. at 44: Exh. 22 and Exh. 23). Although these plans and plat 
don’t have “Development Plan” written on them, the detail of the plans for the future 
phases makes it clear that these were intended to constitute the Final Development Plan 
for this project.  
The development of the balance of the project in phases, was subject to the specific 
approval of the City as noted in the City Council minutes of December 17, 1997, when 
the City Council approved the first phase with “approval for (future) phasing conditioned 
upon approval of the City Engineer and City Council for each phase” (R. at 44: Exh. 12). 
The developer in 1997 had requested and was granted the option of completing the 
balance of the project in one or more phases (R. at 44: 16, p. 1).  Utah law and the City’s 
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Land Use Code require that each phase (plat) be reviewed and approved by the City prior 
to the recording of the plat for a particular phase. The City had a legal duty to review 
each subsequent phase and to approve the project if it was consistent with the Final 
Development Plan proposed by the developer and approved by the City. 
After the final approval of the Phase 1 plat, the original developer commenced 
construction in Phase 1.  In 2004, the original developer conveyed and assigned all of its 
interest in the Country Haven Condominium project to Pacific (R. at 164). Upon 
obtaining title to the condominium project, Pacific determined to modify the PUD as it 
applied to the future phases. 
Nearly ten years after the final approval of the Phase 1 plat, Pacific proposed the 
completion of the future phase(s) of the Country Haven Condominium project by 
submitting a new and revised development plan to the Grantsville City Planning 
Commission. Pacific has designated the balance of the project as Phase 2. Pacific’s 
proposed development plan included the following (R. at 44: Exh. 21): 
a. The construction of 22 buildings with 65 residential units placed in 
locations different than proposed in the approved development plan.  
b. Building types not the same as those located in Phase 1 or those 
identified in the future phases on the original approved plat.  
c. A reconfigured street layout and drainage plan, that is different from the 
engineering plans that were approved with the original development plan. 
d. The area of the residential units proposed for Phase 2 are from 975 
square feet to 1174 feet and all include a single car garage with no plans for 
basements in any unit.  
(R. at 44: Exh. 21; Exh. 9, p. 11; Exh. 5, p. 4.)  
On January 11, 2007, the Grantsville City Planning Commission held a hearing on 
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Pacific’s revised development plan for the Condominium Project (R. 44: Exh. 9). David 
P. “Dade” Rose representing Pacific before the Planning Commission at this meeting 
attempted to make it clear that the completion of the project was in substantial conformity 
with the initially approved development plan. According to the minutes of this meeting, 
Mr. Rose stated:  “We believe we are complying with what happened in 1998 (sic)” and 
... “we feel we have kept the plan close to conditions set by the Commission ten years 
(ago)” (Id. at p. 4). However, statements made later during the same meeting by Pacific’s 
architect Doug Gibson made it clear that Pacific’s revised development plan had some 
similarities but would not substantially conform to the original:  “The placement of the 
units on the site is based on a previously approved condo plat and we have matched that 
as closely as possible.” ... “We reviewed the original construction documents for the first 
eight (8) units and used the same massing, materials and look.” ... “As to the two car 
garage concern, we tried to fit that plan in there, but we couldn’t.” (Id. at pp. 10 & 11). 
On the other hand, the Planning Commission received information from others, including 
Julie Black a resident of Phase 1 and the President of the Country Haven Condominiums 
(the Phase 1 development), who stated on January 11, 2007 that the units in Phase 1 had 
from 1,300 to 2,200 square feet excluding basements. (Id. at p. 11). An examination of 
scale drawings of the units in the Preliminary Plans and Final Plat’s, using a simple ruler, 
supports the information submitted by Julie Black. 
Pacific’s application to amend the Development Plan for the future phases of the 
project was approved by the Grantsville City Planning Commission on January 11, 2007. 
(R. at 44: Exh. 9, p. 12). 
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The Country Haven Homeowners’ Association and a group of property owners 
located adjacent to the proposed Phase 2 (Orchard Lane Homeowners) appealed the 
decision of the Planning Commission to the City Council, the Appeal Authority under 
Grantsville City Code § 12.4(5) for such matters. These appellants argued that the 
proposed development plan for the future phases was a major adjustment and was not in 
substantial conformity with the original development plan for the project. (R. at 44: Exh. 
7 and Exh. 8.) 
On January 25, 2007, Pacific sent a letter to the Grantsville City Planning 
Commission explaining that even though Pacific’s plans did not include basements for 
Phase 2 of the project, Pacific was not opposed to basements and would consider 
basements if the market so dictates, depending on each homeowner’s preference and the 
related purchase price that the homeowner is willing to pay for such an addition. (R. at 
158). This letter, however, was never a part of Pacific’s formal proposal to develop Phase 
2 of the project, and it includes numerous qualifications that indicate that basements 
would never be constructed. 
During this appeal, Mr. Rose appeared on behalf of Pacific before the City Council 
on February 7, 2007, and tried to convince the City Council that Pacific’s proposal was 
either a minor adjustment to the 1997 development plan or if it was deemed to be a major 
adjustment of the development plan, it could be approved pursuant to Section 12.5 of the 
Land Use Code (R. at 44: Exh. 6). As reflected in the minutes of that meeting Mr. Rose 
stated:  
We believe that we are talking about a minor adjustment. Based on the notes 
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on the plat, you can see that minor changes are all that is happening with this 
proposal. Even if it was not minor changes the Code does provide for major 
adjustments to the PUD Ordinance. If you go back through the transcripts of 
January 11, 2007, it talks about the standard for approving a major adjustment. 
That requirement is that it must be in substantial conformity with the original 
plan. 
 
(Id. at p. 2). 
The City Council held a hearing on February 21, 2007 to consider the appeals of the 
Country Haven Homeowner’s Association and the Orchard Lane Homeowners (R. at 44: 
Exh. 5).  At this hearing, the Country Haven Homeowner’s Association presented the 
following information to the Planning Commission and Grantsville City Council: (R. at 
44: Exh. 5 and Exh. 7) 
a. That all of the Units in Phase 1 of the project have two car garages and 
basements. 
b. The unit types C, D, E and F refer to specific floor plans identified as 
Colorado, Dakota, Georgia and Florida. A copy of these floor plans and a 
description of each of these unit types is attached to the City Council’s Findings and 
Decision as Exhibit “A”.  (R. at 44: Exh. 2.)  
c. Unit types C, D, E and F have from 1300 to 2200 square feet and with 
finished basements would have from 2600 to 3500 square feet of finished living 
space. 
d. The current unit owners in Phase 1 were informed by the original 
developer, that the units in the Future Phases, would be identical to those in Phase 1 
and that they relied on these representations when they purchased their units. (R. at 
44: Exh. 7 and Exh. 5, p. 7) 
At this hearing Mr. Rose, on behalf of Pacific, maintained the same position, that 
the completion of the future phases of the project should be approved as either a minor or 
major adjustment to the 1997 development plan (R. at 44: Exh. 5, p. 3-4).  During his 
presentation to the City Council, Mr. Rose attempted again to maintain that the revised 
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development plan contained only minor changes. “First, there’s been a claim saying that 
this project is not in substantial conformity with what was originally approved. Again, 
there are two standards at play here. One standard if it’s a minor change, and a second 
standard if it is a major change. A major change requires that the project be in substantial 
conformity. However, a minor change does not even require that. We have approached 
this Council as well as the Planning Commission believing that we meet both of those 
standards.” (Id. at p. 3.)  Mr. Rose then asserted that Pacific’s changes were only minor 
changes to the original development plan including changes to the road layout and the 
total number of units. (Id. at pp. 3 & 4.) 
In addition, Mr. Rose in responding to the appealing parties’ arguments that 
Pacific’s Phase 2 was not in conformity with the original development plan, conceded 
that the revised development plan contained more than minor changes when he stated that 
“You know, change is specifically built into the law. The law allows for a change 
because of a change of circumstance, a change of dynamics, change of market and that’s 
why we have these Ordinances that you have in Section 12.4 that specifically 
incorporates the element of change and allows for PUD to change as a minor adjustment 
or a major adjustment. So we aren’t talking about just little, simple things and that is 
provided for.”  (Id. at pp. 9 & 10.)  
In addition to the statements from Pacific, the City Council considered at the appeal 
hearing information from Julie Black (R. at 44: Exh. 5, p. 7-8; Exh. 7). After considering 
all of the information provided to it, the Grantsville City Council on March 7, 2007 
overturned the Planning Commission’s approval and rejected Pacific’s proposal to amend 
4846-2457-1395.GR058.001 14
the development plan for Phase 2 of the County Haven Condominiums  (R. at 44: Exh. 2 
and Exh. 3.  A copy of the City Council’s Findings and Decision is attached in the 
Addendum at Tab E.)  The City Council concluded that the proposed project constituted a 
major adjustment to the approved development plan, would require a significant 
modification of the previous written conditions of approval and was not in substantial 
conformity to the previously approved final development plan. (R. at 44: Exh. 2.)  
On April 6, 2007, Pacific filed an appeal of the City Council’s decision with the 
Third Judicial District Court in Tooele County, including claims it had not raised before 
the City Council or the Planning Commission (R. at 3-14). Grantsville prepared and 
submitted the administrative record to the district court and filed a motion for summary 
judgment on June 27, 2007 (R. at 28, 44).  Pacific cross-filed for summary judgment as 
well, on August 13, 2007 (R. at 47).  
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Grantsville City appeals the judgment of the district court on two main grounds: 
FIRST, that the district court improperly received and considered evidence and claims 
Pacific never raised before the City Council; and, SECOND, that even if Pacific’s evidence 
and claims were not barred, the district court nonetheless erred in granting Pacific 
summary and declaratory judgment. 
1. IMPROPER SUBMISSION OF EVIDENCE OUTSIDE THE ADMINISTRATIVE RECORD. 
UCA § 10-9a-801(3) mandates that a court reviewing a land-use decision must 
presume it is valid and determine only whether it was arbitrary, capricious, or illegal. 
Section 10-9a-801(8) limits the court’s review to the record made before the appeal 
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authority: The court may neither accept nor consider any evidence outside the 
administrative record unless it was offered at the administrative level but improperly 
excluded or no record was made for the court to review. In addition to barring unraised 
evidence, Utah law also bans unheard issues: “a party seeking review of agency action 
must raise an issue before that agency to preserve the issue for further review.” Badger v. 
Brooklyn Canal Co., 966 P.2d 844, 847 (Utah 1998). 
Pacific disregarded the prohibition, submitting testimony to the court in the form of 
three affidavits, claiming its due process rights had been infringed by the City Council’s 
consideration of a sales brochure submitted by Julie Black of the Country Haven 
Homeowners Association. The brochure, however, simply reiterates evidence already 
before the Council. Moreover, its submission is a non-issue: the court redacted the 
brochure before ruling that Grantsville’s decision was warranted by substantial evidence 
on the Record. The three affidavits should thus have been stricken. 
They were not, however. Instead, Pacific used them as the basis of new claims, 
none of which had been brought before the City Council: claiming to be a bona-fide 
purchaser, that the PUD had expired, that the project’s CC&Rs were no longer 
applicable, even that the statute of frauds somehow invalidated the development plan. 
Again, however, none of these was brought to the awareness of the City Council, despite 
the provision in the Grantsville Code (§ 3.22) that requires an adversely affected party to 
present to the appeal authority every theory of relief it could raise in district court.  In 
sum, the three affidavits should have been stricken, Pacific’s extraneous claims based 
upon them dismissed, and the district court’s judgment thereon vacated. 
4846-2457-1395.GR058.001 16
2. THE COURT’S DECISION WAS ERRONEOUS. 
Grantsville’s second ground for appeal is essentially that the district court’s granting 
summary and declaratory judgment to Pacific on its various extraneous claims would 
have been erroneous even if the three affidavits and the several claims Pacific based 
thereon had been properly preserved and submitted. 
 To begin with, Pacific’s major premise—that there has never been a final 
development plan to which it can be held—is untrue. There is a Development Plan: It is 
comprised of the original, November 1997 engineering drawings requested by Garry 
Bolinder and G&S Investments, Pacific’s predecessor in interest, together with the Final 
Plat (R. at 44, exh. 23) recorded at the Bolinders’ request in May of 1998. These 
documents specify utility locations, road locations, driveways, and the exact locations of 
23 buildings making up 63 residential units, identified by the same letters and similar in 
size and configuration to the buildings in the first phase. Pacific’s arguments before the 
City Council also specifically and repeatedly referenced the original, 1997 development 
plan, of which its new plan was to be a “minor alteration.” The existence of the Final 
Plat, in its own records as well as in the County Recorder’s office would put Pacific on 
actual, constructive, and inquiry notice of the PUD and its governing restrictions. 
Pacific knew far too much about the PUD for far too long to claim that it was a 
bona-fide purchaser, one of the new claims it raised before the district court. And whether 
a party is a bona-fide purchaser is a question of fact anyway. This should have precluded 
summary judgment on this point, and this Court is bound to vacate the award. 
Pacific has also claimed that the PUD had expired by operation of the one-year 
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diligent pursuit provision in Grantsville Code § 12.4(5). This provision is irrelevant, 
however, since construction began in the first phase and was timely constructed, and 
Section 12.4(5) doesn’t require build-out of future phases to satisfy the provision.  Pacific 
also claims that the applicable CC&Rs, having been amended, none of the final 
development requirements any longer applies. In reality, though, a PUD cannot be 
amended by filing a new set of CC&Rs, and the district court should not have ruled 
otherwise. Finally, zoning restrictions, including the parameters of a PUD, are laws, not 
contracts subject to the statute of frauds, despite Pacific’s claim to the contrary. 
ARGUMENT 
At issue in the present dispute is the district court’s grant of summary and declaratory 
judgment to Pacific on its several claims regarding bona-fide purchase, termination of 
relevant CC&Rs, and expiration of the PUD.1   
I. THE DISTRICT COURT IMPROPERLY RECEIVED AND CONSIDERED CLAIMS 
AND EVIDENCE OUTSIDE THE RECORD BEFORE THE GRANTSVILLE CITY 
COUNCIL. 
 
A. Utah Law Restricts District Court Review of Land-Use Appeals to the 
Record Made before the Designated Local Land-Use or Appeal Authority. 
 
                                                 
 1 Immediately after the granting Grantsville’s motion for summary judgment, 
affirming the City’s denial of Pacific’s proposal as neither arbitrary and capricious nor 
illegal, the district court turned around and granted Pacific’s summary and declaratory 
judgment motions (R. at 301, pp. 118 to 122; R. at 268-74). Those motions, however, 
asserted the validity of Pacific’s proposal on the grounds, inter alia, that Pacific was a 
bona-fide purchaser and that the PUD had expired anyway—either of which, if true 
(neither is), would have rendered Grantsville’s denial arbitrary and capricious (as 
unsupported in the record) or illegal (as contrary to the laws regarding bona-fide purchase 
and the interpretation of local ordinances). Thus, the district court’s upholding 
Grantsville’s denial foreclosed its granting Pacific’s contradictory motions.  
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UCA § 10-9a-801(3)(a) mandates that a court reviewing a land-use decision must 
“(i) presume [the] decision … valid; and (ii) determine only whether [it was] arbitrary, 
capricious, or illegal” (emphasis added). In making this determination, “a district court’s 
review is limited to the record provided by the land use authority or appeal authority, as 
the case may be,” id. §-801(8)(a)(i)(emphasis added); more to the point, “[t]he court may 
not accept or consider any evidence outside the [administrative] record … unless [it] was 
[a] offered [at the administrative level] and the court determines that it was improperly 
excluded,” id. §-801(8)(a)(ii)(emphasis added), or [b] “[i]f there is no record” at all, id. §-
801(8)(b). 
The Courts have often reaffirmed this basic rule, but nowhere more powerfully, 
perhaps, than in Badger v. Brooklyn Canal Co., 966 P.2d 844 (Utah 1998): 
[A] party seeking review of agency action must raise an issue before that 
agency to preserve the issue for further review. … [Moreover,] “persons 
aggrieved by decisions of administrative agencies ‘may not, by refusing or 
neglecting to submit issues of fact to such agencies, by-pass them, and call 
upon the courts to determine ... matters properly determinable originally by 
such agencies.’ ”  
 
Id. at 847 (quoting S & G, Inc. v. Morgan, 797 P.2d 1085, 1087 (Utah 1990) (itself quoting 
People v. Keith Ry. Equip. Co., 161 P.2d 244, 249 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1945))). Of course, 
where an administrative record is incomplete or nonexistent, as in, for instance, Xanthos 
v. Board of Adjustment of Salt Lake City, 685 P.2d 1032 (Utah 1984), where no 
administrative record had been made, the Utah Supreme Court held that, since 
[t]he nature and extent of the review depends on what happened below as 
reflected by a true record of the proceedings … in the light of accepted due 
process requirements.… [then, on the one hand,] if the [administrative] 
hearing had proceeded in accordance with due process requirements, the 
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reviewing court could look only to the record[; but, on the other hand], … 
where it had not or where there was nothing to review, the reviewing court 
must be allowed to get at the facts. 
Id. at 1034 (emphasis added) (quoting Denver & Rio Grande W. RR. Co. v. Cent. Weber 
Sewer Improvement Dist., 287 P.2d 884, 887 (Utah 1955)). Accordingly, the Xanthos 
Court reasoned, “there [being] no record of the [administrative] proceedings, due process 
would be denied if the district court could not get at the facts,” and so “the district court 
[was permitted to] take additional evidence.” Id. Even then, however, the additional 
evidence “must be relevant to the issues that were raised and considered by the Board.” 
Id. at 1034–35. 
Similarly, in B.A.M. Development, L.L.C. v. Salt Lake County, 2006 UT 2, 128 
P.3d 1161, a local administrative body had upheld an exaction without holding any 
hearing, taking any evidence, or issuing any findings or conclusions. As in Xanthos, the 
reviewing district court determined to receive evidence, there being no record to review. 
This Court, however, following the then-extant legislative mandate of UCA § 17-27-
1001(3)(a)(repealed 2005), concluded that the district court had erred in receiving 
evidence,2 and remanded the case for a determination as to which local body should 
                                                 
2 Former UCA § 17-27-1001(3)(a) was identical to former UCA § 10-9-1001(3)(a), 
which was also repealed by the 2005 enactment of the new LUDMA (SB 60S02 (2005); 
2005 Utah Laws 254). Neither of these sections addressed the role of an administrative 
record. A provision limiting review to the record did appear in former UCA §§ 10-9-
708(5) & 17-27-708(5), but this Court read that provision as applicable only to review of 
board-of-adjustment decisions, 2004 UT App 34, ¶7 nn. 5 & 6; this on the basis of a 
canon of construction sometimes called “the dog in the night-time,” see Chisom v. 
Roemer, 501 U.S. 380, 396 n.23 (1991).  The fact that §-708 (review of board-of-
adjustment decisions) did permit the taking of evidence in the absence of a record while 
§-1001 did not, was construed to bar acceptance of evidence in a review that did not 
involve a board of adjustment. B.A.M., 2004 UT App 34 at ¶12. 
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review the matter. B.A.M. v. Salt Lake County, 2004 UT App 34, ¶13, 87 P.3d 710. The 
Utah Supreme Court granted certiorari on August 5, 2004 (98 P.3d 1177 (Table)), but 
ultimately declared the issue moot as a result of the passage of the 2005 LUDMA, which 
“details proper district court review of a … land-use decision,” 2006 UT 2, ¶3, expressly 
confining judicial review of administrative decisions to the record alone unless (and only 
unless) that record is deficient. 
 As these various rulings and the related LUDMA provisions, make abundantly 
clear, a party may not submit, nor a reviewing court receive, either issues or evidence 
which were not first raised before or proffered to the administrative tribunal. This, 
however, is precisely what Pacific and the district court have done in the present case. 
B. The District Court Improperly Considered the Affidavits Pacific 
Presented for the First Time on Review. 
Despite the clear mandate discussed above, Pacific submitted three affidavits—
those of Caleb Roope, Douglas Gibson, and Dennis Vanderheiden (R. at 79–85, 97–102, 
& 93–96, respectively)—flatly inadmissible under UCA § 10-9a-801, on the grounds that 
the Grantsville City Council “violated Pacific’s due process rights” (R. at 231). The 
nature of this alleged violation appears to have been the City Council’s receipt and 
reliance upon a sales brochure that Julie Black, president of the Country Haven 
Homeowners Association, submitted after the City Council hearing on February 21, 
2007, but before the Council’s decision issued on March 7, 2007 (R. at 230-31).  
1. The Propriety of the Brochure is a Non-Issue. 
Even if the Julie Black brochure were somehow improper evidence—something 
other than the simple summary it is of building types and floor plans already in the Final 
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Development Plan and presented at the February 21, 2007, appeal hearing—its 
evidentiary propriety is a non-issue because ultimately, the district court’s ruling was not 
based in any way upon the Julie Black brochure:  
What I’ve done is I’ve gone through the decision that was submitted as Exhibit 
2 and I’ve redacted all of the information that was included in the letter by Ms. 
Black to see if, in fact, it was an issue of harmless error to include her 
conclusions despite the fact that the Petitioner didn’t have an opportunity to 
respond to those in the meeting.  
After I do redact those, I find that in fact there is substantial evidence 
supporting the decision of the City and, therefore, the appeal based upon that 
and based upon the quantum and quality of the evidence is adequate to 
convince a reasonable mind to support the conclusion which is the requirement 
or substantial evidence I find for that reason the appeal is dismissed.  
(R. at 301, pp. 118:18–119:6.) 3   
2. Pacific Cannot Unilaterally Allege a Due-Process Violation, 
Pronounce Itself, as a Result, Free to Disregard a Clear Statutory Ban, 
Add Evidence to a Closed Record, and Raise New Claims Based 
Thereon. 
Regardless of the nature and status of the Black brochure as evidence—proper or 
improper—certainly, Pacific’s solution is out of all proportion to the supposed offense. In 
response to what it has labeled Grantsville’s “violat[ion of] Pacific’s due process rights” 
(R. at 151), Pacific has somehow seceded from LUDMA. Its cannonade against §-
801(8)’s Fort Sumter (so to speak) reads as follows: 
Even though judicial review is based on the record, that record must be 
“viewed in the light of accepted due process requirements.” Xanthos v. Board 
of Adjustment, 685 P.2d 1032, 1034 (Utah 1984). These due process 
requirements exist to ensure, as the Court said in Springville Citizens, “that the 
                                                 
3 Strictly speaking, of course, this point goes to Pacific’s cross-appeal rather than to 
Grantsville’s appeal. However, because the foundation of the rulings against which 
Grantsville contends are the affidavits Pacific ostensibly submitted in response to the 
Julie Black brochure, the district court’s redaction thereof takes on a significance belied 
by its apparent innocuousy (as discussed in § I.D, below). 
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City proceeded within the limits of fairness and acted in good faith.” 1999 UT 
25, ¶24. If due process requirements have not been met, then the Court is 
entitled to consider evidence outside the record in order to “get at the facts.”  
The Court must then “be allowed to take its own evidence and need not 
necessarily be limited to the evidence presented” before the City. Xanthos, 685 
P.2d at 1034. [Therefore, b]ecause the City violated Pacific’s due process 
rights in basing its decision on documents and evidence at the February 21, 
2007, hearing and without given Pacific a chance to respond, Pacific has 
presented additional evidence outside the record. That evidence is presented 
through the affidavits of Caleb Roope, Douglas Gibson, and Dennis 
Vanderheiden … . 
(R. at 151). This is Pacific’s entire argument on this point. 
 Because a complete and unassailable administrative record exists (R. at 44), Pacific 
has taken language from Xanthos (out of context) to bolster its argument that the City 
Council’s review of the Black brochure—despite its being essentially a duplicative 
summary of evidence already in the record—infringed its due-process rights.  And, 
although the author wove them well, the quotations above do not say what Pacific wishes 
them to.  
 To begin with, of course, Pacific would be hard pressed to find a case less 
supportive of its position. In Xanthos, there was no administrative record to which the 
district court could turn, and its receipt of evidence “to get at the facts” was entirely 
reasonable. 685 P.2d at 1034.  As the Court there explained: 
[I]f the hearing had proceeded in accordance with due process requirements, 
the reviewing court could look only to the record, but where it had not or 
where there was nothing to review, the reviewing court must be allowed to get 
at the facts. 
 * * * * 
[T]he district court may [in such circumstances] take additional evidence, but 
it must be relevant to the issues that were raised and considered by the Board.  
Id. at 1034–35. Pacific makes much of the adverbial “in accordance with due process 
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requirements,” stressing that the Black brochure’s submission and receipt was exactly the 
sort of due-process infraction the Xanthos Court sought to avert. 
 Pacific, however, misreads Xanthos.  In making its ruling, the Xanthos Court relied 
upon the reasoning of the Denver & Rio Grande Court, who noted that an administrative 
body would have complied with the “accepted due process requirements” if it had 
“conducted a hearing, taken evidence, heard witnesses under oath and otherwise had 
proceeded in accordance with such due process requirements,” 287 P.2d at 887 (citing 42 
Am. Jur. p. 449 § 116).4 These are plainly general considerations, applicable to entire 
proceedings, not to duplicative summaries of evidence already available which wind up 
being disregarded anyway. Such a misstep—if misstep it was—does not rise to the level 
of a serious breach in the process due to Pacific, or to anyone else for that matter.  As the 
Utah Supreme Court recently noted:
The hallmarks of due process are notice and an opportunity to be heard, but 
not all proceedings demand the same level of process. The level of process 
required generally depends on the following factors: 
First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; 
[S]econd, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through 
the procedures used, and [Third] the probable value, if any, of 
additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, [Fourth] 
the Government’s interest, including the function involved and the 
fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute 
procedural requirement would entail. 
                                                 
4 Unfortunately, the reviewing court was presented with very little to review in the 
Denver & Rio Grande case, and the Supreme Court felt this deficiency merited the taking 
of evidence beyond the record: “[W]here, as here, there is nothing to review but an ipse 
dixit, due process would be denied if the reviewing Court could not get at the facts.” 287 
P.2d at 887. 
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Utah County v. Ivie, 2006 UT 33, ¶22, 137 P.3d 797 (emphasis added; citation omitted).5
Going through these factors one at a time: (1) The private interest affected is fairly 
minimal, since Pacific may build out Country Haven according to the approved original 
plan whenever it likes; it is not being held hostage. (2) There is very little risk—none in 
fact—of Pacific’s being “erroneous[ly] deprive[ed]” of a property interest it has never 
had (that is, to disregard the approved 1997 Project Plans); however, Pacific has been 
given full and free opportunity to present its arguments, including Planning Commission 
and City Council hearings both in 2005 and in 2007 (R. at 44: Exh. 5, Exh. 9, Exh. 10, 
and Exh. 11). (3) There would have been little or no practical value in reconvening the 
City Council for Pacific to respond to the Black brochure, since Pacific’s response would 
have been, of necessity, simply be a reiteration of points it had already made, the 
brochure being little more than a summary of information already in the record (see, e.g., 
R. at 44: Exh. 10 & Exh. 22). And, finally, (4) as noted, such a rehearing would have 
required still another rehashing of by-now-well-known data, information, and arguments 
                                                 
5 The omitted citation upon which the Ivie Court relied was to Mathews v. Eldridge, 
424 U.S. 319 (1976), which gives somewhat more slack even than Ivie to what 
constitutes sufficient procedural due process: 
We reiterate … that differences in the origin and function of administrative 
agencies preclude wholesale transplantation of the rules of procedure, trial and 
review which have evolved from the history and experience of courts.…The 
essence of due process is the requirement that a person in jeopardy of 
serious loss (be given) notice of the case against him and opportunity to 
meet it. All that is necessary is that the procedures be tailored, in light of the 
decision to be made, to the capacities and circumstances of those who are to be 
heard, to insure that they are given a meaningful opportunity to present their 
case. 
Id. at 335 (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 
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(developer’s doggedness versus neighbor annoyance) leading right back to where we are 
now. 
Pacific will have to find something much stronger that the Black brochure upon 
which to base both its extra evidence and its additional arguments. As it is, though, 
Pacific’s response to this three-page pamphlet (three affidavits, one of them quite 
lengthy, and a Rule 56(f) motion, and two extraneous causes of action) seems somewhat 
disproportionate. 
In any case, regardless of Pacific’s vehemence, and the tenor of its rhetoric, the fact 
remains that, except in the absence or improper deficiency of the administrative record, 
UCA § 10-9a-801(8) outlaws the acceptance or consideration of any evidence beyond the 
record created before the land-use or appeal authority. As a result, the Affidavits of Caleb 
Roope, Douglas Gibson, and Dennis Vanderheiden should have been excluded from the 
district court’s proceedings and cannot serve as the foundation of any of the new claims 
Pacific has asserted based upon them. This Court must therefore disregard both Pacific’s 
affidavits and its arguments resting on the information in them. 
C. Pacific’s Failure to Raise its Bona-Fide–Purchaser and PUD-Termination/ 
Unenforceability6 Claims before the Grantsville City Council Barred its 
Raising them before the District Court. 
1. State law bars Pacific’s raising its extraneous claims. 
In Badger v. Brooklyn Canal, as noted above, the Utah Supreme Court explained 
the rationale behind record-only review as analogous to the long-established rule that a 
litigant must raise an issue before the district court in order to preserve it for appeal: 
                                                 
6 For the sake of brevity, the PUD-termination/unenforceability claims shall be 
denominated the “No-PUD” claims throughout. 
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In a trial setting, to preserve an issue for appellate review, a party must first 
raise the issue in the trial court. That is, a trial court must be offered an 
opportunity to rule on an issue…. The purpose of [this] requirement[] is to put 
the judge on notice of the asserted error and allow the opportunity for 
correction at that time in the course of the proceeding. Issues not raised at trial 
are usually deemed waived. 
Similarly, a party seeking review of [an] agency action must raise an 
issue before that agency to preserve the issue for further review. It is well 
settled that persons aggrieved by decisions of administrative agencies may not, 
by refusing or neglecting to submit issues of fact to such agencies, by-pass 
them, and call upon the courts to determine ... matters properly determinable 
originally by such agencies.  
Badger, 966 P.2d at 847–48 (emphasis added) (citations and internal quotation marks 
omitted). In non-administrative proceedings, a claim is barred on appellate review unless 
it was demonstrably brought to the district court’s attention both (1) timely and (2) 
specifically, together with (3) supporting evidence or legal authority. Id. at 848 (quoting 
Hart v. Salt Lake County Comm’n, 945 P.2d 125, 130 (Utah Ct. App. 1997)). A rather 
less stringent standard applies to issues on district-court review of administrative actions, 
however: 
[The] strict waiver analysis ... appli[cable] to issues or objections not raised 
before a trial court…. does not apply … to [agency] hearings … but instead … 
a “level of consciousness” test, requiring a plaintiff to bring an issue to the fact 
finder’s attention so that there is at least the possibility that it could be 
considered. 
Id. at 848 (citing US Xpress, Inc. v. State Tax Comm’n, 886 P.2d 1115, 1119 n.7 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1994)).  
This clear, straightforward rule plainly mandates that before it could properly raise 
its bona-fide–purchaser and No-PUD claims before the district court (R. at 250 & 301, 
pp. 119–120), Pacific should have brought them first to the attention of the Grantsville 
City Council. One searches the administrative record (R. at 44) in vain, however, for any 
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mention of Pacific’s bona-fide–purchaser or No-PUD claims before either the Planning 
Commission or City Council. These appear nowhere until the filing of Pacific’s Petition 
for Review7 (R. at 4–6), never having been so much as mentioned, let alone addressed, at 
the administrative level.  
Pacific, however, was well aware of this fact, as it has essentially admitted in its 
Memorandum in Support of Rule 56 Motion and supporting Affidavit (see R. at 109 & 
113) as well as in its Memorandum in Support of its Motion for Summary Judgement 
(see R. at 151 & 123–26) wherein it asserted its new causes of action on the basis of the 
improper and extraneous Roope, Gibson, and Vanderheiden affidavits (R. at 79–85, 97–
102, & 93–96, respectively). Inclusion of these arguments is in direct defiance of clear, 
iron-clad statutory and case law forbidding the introduction of anything beyond the 
administrative record.  Pacific’s addition of these extraneous bona-fide–purchaser and 
No-PUD claims to its Petition for Review was thus improper; as a result, these claims 
must be dismissed as beyond the jurisdiction of the Courts. 
2. Grantsville ordinance also bars Pacific’s introduction of issues beyond 
those raised before the City Council. 
UCA § 10-9a-701(4)(c) grants Utah municipalities the power to “require an 
adversely affected party to present to an appeal authority every theory of relief that it can 
                                                 
7 Grantsville notes again, in this context, that § 10-9a-801 limits administrative review to 
the record below. Given the absolute restriction of §-801(3)(a)(ii)—“shall … determine 
ONLY whether [the administrative determination was] arbitrary, capricious, or illegal” 
(emphasis added)—a litigant cannot lawfully present ANY cause of action beyond the 
straightforward, statutory arbitrary-and-capricious–or-illegal claim. If a litigant were 
allowed to present such claims, then the §-801(3)(a)(ii) restriction becomes meaningless, 
as does the §-801(8) limitation of review to the record.  
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raise in district court.” Pursuant to this legislative grant, local Grantsville ordinance 
provides that, “[i]n making an appeal, an adversely affected party shall present to the 
appeal authority every theory of relief that it can raise in district court.” Grantsville Code 
§ 3.22 (emphasis added). 
Pacific’s raising of its bona-fide–purchaser and No-PUD claims thus also falls foul 
of both LUDMA and Grantsville ordinance. Pacific simply cannot be heard on its new 
causes of action: it is a violation of the clear language of UCA § 10-9a-801, all relevant 
case law, and uncomplicated local ordinance. Such broad-spectrum disregard for the law 
must not be permitted to jam monkey-wrench precedent into the smooth operation of the 
only recently retooled mechanism of Utah land-use law. 
D. Conclusion to Part I. 
To sum up: (1) The record-only rule of UCA § 10-9a-801(8)(a) forbids the 
introduction of evidence outside the administrative record. (2) Pacific submitted the 
Roope, Gibson, and Vanderheiden affidavits on the pretext that City Council 
consideration of the Black brochure somehow erased §-801(8)(a) and all of the case law 
from which it derives. (3) It was upon these affidavits that Pacific constructed its 
extraneous bona-fide–purchaser and No-PUD claims. It follows, then, (4) that the 
redaction—or harmlessness—of the Black brochure entirely eliminated any foundation 
(however unconvincing) for submitting the three improper affidavits. As a result, (5) 
Pacific’s extraneous claims are left without even their original sandy foundation, and the 
district court’s granting summary and declaratory judgments thereon becomes, not just 
improper, but impossible. 
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In sum, the Roope, Gibson, and Vanderheiden affidavits must be stricken, the bona-
fide–purchaser and No-PUD claims based upon them dismissed, and the district court’s 
judgment thereon vacated. 
II. EVEN IF PACIFIC’S ADDITIONAL CLAIMS AND EVIDENCE WERE ARGUENDO 
PROPERLY BEFORE THE DISTRICT COURT, THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN 
GRANTING SUMMARY AND DECLARATORY JUDGEMENT THEREON. 
A. Pacific’s Claim that it is a Bona-Fide Purchaser Must Fail on Both 
Procedural and Substantive Grounds. 
The first of the two causes of action Pacific improperly raised for the first time in its 
petition for review is its claim to be a bona-fide purchaser without notice of—and hence 
not bound by—the original PUD’s final plat approval. Utah law as to the nature and 
rights of bona-fide purchasers comes from Chapter 57-3 of the Utah Code: 
Each document not recorded as provided in this title is void as against any 
subsequent purchaser of the same real property, or any portion of it, if: (1) the 
subsequent purchaser purchased the property in good faith and for a valuable 
consideration; and (2) the subsequent purchaser’s document is first duly 
recorded. 
 
UCA § 57-3-103.  
1. There is a Development Plan for Future Phases. 
Central to Pacific’s arguments is its allegation that the Final Plat (approved back in 
1997) contains no “development plan” that it is duty bound to follow: no engineering 
drawings, no list of requirements for the several unit types, no floor plans (See, e.g., R. at 
134-44).  In short, Pacific argues that there is nothing to which it may be held in further 
developing future phases of Country Haven. It is of this set of “restrictions” that Pacific 
now claims to have had no knowledge upon purchase, seeking to be excused therefrom.  
This, however, is entirely untrue: the original, November 1997 engineering 
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drawings (R. at 44, Exh. 22) include street, utility, and grading diagrams. The client is 
identified upon the drawings (lower right-hand corner) as “Garry Bolinder” (a 
representative of Pacific at present) (Id. at Sheets 3, 9, & 10 of 10), “G&S Investments 
(sheet 4 of 10), or “Bolinder” (Id. at Sheets 6, 7, & 8 of 10).8  The drawing, submitted by 
the developer and approved by the City, also show the same detail for the completion of 
the future phases as they do for the completion of Phase 1. The “Grading Plan,” for the 
future phases lists the elevations of the roads, buildings, and storm retention areas, and 
identifies flow directions and the exact location and elevations of storm drain lines (Id. at 
Sheet 3 of 10). The “Utility Plan” for the future phases, includes the size and layout of 
the sewer and waterlines, manholes, valves and fire hydrants (Id. at Sheet 4 of 10). The 
“Plan and Profile” for all of the roads in the project, includes detailed specifications for 
the future phases (id. at Sheets 6 & 7 of 10). The “Storm Drain” details for the entire 
project, including the future phases, are also included (id. at Sheet 8 of 10). Finally, the 
letter designations of the units in the Future Phases are the same as the designations of the 
units in the first phase (id. at Sheet 3 of 10). 
The Final Plat (R. at 44, Exh. 23), “recorded at the request of Garry L. and Stacey P. 
Bolinder” at 10:36 a.m. on May 5th, 1998, depicts both “Phase 1” and “Future Phases”; an 
“Owner’s Dedication” signed by the Bolinders; a legend showing survey monuments, 
hydrant locations, power pole locations, and utility setbacks; a scale drawing of the 
proposed roads, storm retention areas, a sports court, and driveways (most are wide 
enough to accommodate two cars side by side and two car garages). (Id.) The Final Plat 
                                                 
8 Sheets 1, 2, & 5 appear to be missing from the Record. 
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also shows scale drawings and the exact location of 23 buildings comprising 63 
residential units, identified as types A, C, D, E and F, similar in size and configuration as 
the residential units in the first phase. (Id.)  
Pacific cannot credibly claim that it was unaware of a development plan that its own 
representatives and its predecessor in interest had had prepared. Most of its argument 
before the City Council relied directly upon the existence of a final development plan of 
which their new plan was only a “minor alteration” of the development plan it now 
wishes to deny even exists: 
We believe we are complying with what happened in 1998 … . We feel we 
have kept the plan close to conditions set by the Commission ten years [ago]. 
  
(R. at 44, Exh. 9, p.4); 
 
The placement of the units on the site is based on a previously approved condo 
plat and we have matched that as closely as possible… . We reviewed the 
original construction documents for the first eight units and used that same 
massing, materials and look… . As to the two car garage concern, we tried to 
fit that plan in there, but we couldn’t. 
 
(R. at 44, Exh. 9, pp. 10–11); or 
 
[I]n order to really understand what was approved for the Country Haven 
Condo’s [sic] you must go to the recorded plat for the requirements… . We 
believe that … we are talking about a minor adjustment. 
 
(R. at 44, Exh.6, p. 2). These and other statements demonstrate that Pacific was well 
aware of the final development plan it now wishes did not exist; the fact remains, 
however, that they were and it does, and further development must abide by its 
strictures. 
2. Pacific had Actual, Constructive, and Inquiry Notice of the 
Restrictions on the PUD prior to purchase. 
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The comments quoted above would seem to topple any claim by Pacific as to bona-
fide purchase. Under Utah law,    
To be in good faith, a subsequent purchaser must take the property [a] without 
notice of a prior, unrecorded interest in the property[, and] … [b] without 
notice of any infirmity in his grantor’s title. This … is not confined to … 
actual notice of an unrecorded interest or infirmity in the grantor's title[, 
but].… includes … constructive notice of such information [as well], 
including both [i] record notice[,] which results from a record or which is 
imputed by the recording statutes, and [ii] inquiry notice[,] … presumed 
because of the fact that a person has knowledge of certain facts which should 
impart to him, or lead him to, knowledge of the ultimate fact. 
 
Salt Lake County v. Metro West Ready Mix, Inc., 2004 UT 23, ¶13, 89 P.3d 155 
(emphasis added; internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (citing, inter alia, 
Paldevco Ltd. P’ship v. City of Auburn Hills, 1998 WL 1988569, *2 (Mich. Ct. App. 
Dec. 18, 1998) (unpublished per curiam decision) (“Notice need only be of the possibility 
of the rights of another, not positive knowledge of those rights.” (Emphasis added)) A 
copy of this decision is included in the Addendum as Tab E). 
 Applying the above test to the present matter demonstrates that Pacific had ample—
even abundant—notice of the approved engineering drawings (R. at 44: Exh. 22) and 
final plat (R. at 44: Exh. 23), and this knowledge precludes anything like bona-fide–
purchaser status for Pacific. Pacific, nonetheless, urges its claim under UCA § 57-3-103, 
which states in relevant part, that “[e]ach document not recorded as provided in this title 
is void as against any subsequent purchaser of the same real property.” 
 The documents from which arise the strictures to which Pacific objects, however, 
either have been recorded with the Final Plat in 1998, or have been in the possession of 
Pacific from the beginning (else it would not have been able to present a “minor 
4846-2457-1395.GR058.001 33
amendment” to the City). Of course, the recording of the Plat showing future phases and 
plans for those phases (R. at 44: Exh. 22 and Exh. 23) provides precisely the constructive 
notice to Pacific contemplated by Metro West Ready Mix.  There is absolutely no 
question these plans have been on file providing notice since 1998.  And regardless, a 
document cannot be invalidated as to any party with actual notice of its existence, UCA § 
57-3-102(3), such as Pacific obviously is.  In any case, the mere existence of the Final 
Plat in the County Recorder’s office alone put Pacific on notice that the property was a 
part of a Planned Unit Development, and that a detailed plan for the development of the 
balance of the property existed.  
 Most tellingly, however, according to Pacific’s own arguments, it was aware of all 
of the documents—the engineering drawings, the Final Plat, and the minutes from the 
City Council’s original approval—prior to making its application to develop the “future 
phases” of the property. (R. at 167-69.) 
 This claim should never have gone before the court, since it was not raised before 
the City Council; but, even assuming the argument were proper, Pacific cannot lay 
credible claim to being a bona-fide purchaser of the Country Haven property; it knew far 
too much about the PUD for far too long.  
3. A Determination of Bona-Fide Purchase is a Factual Question that 
Precludes Summary Judgment. 
Grantsville notes that Utah law recognizes the determination of whether one is a 
bona-fide purchaser as a question of fact, Timm v. Dewsnup, 921 P.2d 1381, 1394 (Utah 
1996) (“the determination of whether the trust deed property was sold to a bona fide 
purchaser or to one with actual or constructive notice … involves questions of fact which 
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must be determined by the trial court on remand”); Nokes v. Continental Mining & 
Milling Co., 308 P.2d 954, 954 (Utah 1957) (in which “[t]he controlling question [was] 
one of fact:  Was Mr. Nokes a bona fide purchaser for value[?]”). Summary judgment, 
however, is intended to resolve issues of law, and is inappropriate in the presence of 
material issues of fact. Ellsworth Paulsen Const. Co. v. 51-SPR-L.L.C., 2008 UT 28, ¶14, 
183 P.3d 248.  As the Supreme Court has explained, 
On an appeal of a district court’s entry of summary judgment, we apply the 
same standard as applied by the district court. City Consumer Servs. v. Peters, 
815 P.2d 234, 239 (Utah 1991); Durham v. Margetts, 571 P.2d 1332, 1334 
(Utah 1977). According to that standard, summary judgment is only 
appropriate where “there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and ... the 
moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” URCP 56(c). 
“‘When reviewing a court’s decision to grant summary judgment, we examine 
the court’s legal conclusions for correctness.’” Young v. Salt Lake City Sch. 
Dist., 2002 UT 64, ¶ 10, 52 P.3d 1230 (quoting Tustian v. Schriever, 2001 UT 
84, ¶ 13, 34 P.3d 755). “If, after a review of the record, it appears that there is 
a material factual issue, we are compelled to reverse the trial court’s grant of 
summary judgment.” W. Farm Credit Bank v. Pratt, 860 P.2d 376, 378 (Utah 
Ct.App.1993) (citing Amica Mut. Ins. Co. v. Schettler, 768 P.2d 950, 957 
(Utah Ct.App.1989)).  
Smith v. Four Corners Mental Health Center, Inc., 2003 UT 23, ¶13, 70 P.3d 904.   
In the present case, of course, the administrative record is replete with evidence 
directly contesting Pacific’s bona-fide–purchaser claim (see § II.A.1, above), creating 
numerous issues of material fact if not more.  The district court thus could not properly 
grant summary judgment, and this Court “[is] compelled to reverse” it. Ellsworth, 2008 
UT 28 at ¶14. 
B. Pacific’s Claim that the PUD has been Extinguished Must Fail Because it 
is Based upon an Erroneous Reading of Grantsville Code § 12.4(5). 
Pacific’s second improper claim (as not brought before the City Council) is the 
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assertion of the Grantsville Code’s provision regarding PUD lifespans:  
No planned unit development permit shall be valid for a period longer than 
one year unless a building permit has been issued, construction has actually 
begun within that period and construction has been diligently pursued. 
 
City Code § 12.4(5). Permits, however, were issued for Phase I, unquestionably part of 
the PUD, and construction did begin thereon within the one-year limit, and it was 
diligently pursued to completion. (R. at 203-04.) Residential units and the necessary 
infrastructure were timely constructed in Phase 1. Section 12.4(5) does not require 
construction to begin or to be pursued in the future phases of a project until those future 
phases are included on an approved final plat and the infrastructure improvements for 
that phase have been bonded for.9  
It must be remembered that Pacific pursued the completion of the project before the 
Planning Commission and City Council with the expressed grounds it was in substantial 
conformity with the original development plan. Pacific cannot now claim that the PUD is 
void, after it has attempted to use the previously approved “final development plan” as 
the basis upon which the future phases of the project would be completed. By using the 
previously approved PUD as a starting point, Pacific avoided the requirement of 
submitting a new concept plan and being required to have public hearings on a new 
proposal that undoubtedly would be opposed by the neighbors. 
Moreover, Pacific can hardly denounce the PUD as void after having brought it 
before the City in 2005 and in 2007 seeking to complete the project in conformity with 
the initial plan (R. at 224). Pacific can’t take one stand one day and then a completely 
                                                 
9 It would hardly seem practical or logical to have future phases, six in this case, if future 
phases had to be constructed within the year. 
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contradictory one the next, but even if it could, LUD&M § 12.4(5) shouldn’t apply to 
terminate the PUD, since it timely began, and the one-year limitation has not been 
violated. 
C. Pacific’s Claim that the Country Haven CC&Rs no Longer Apply to the 
Land at Issue is Irrelevant. 
Pacific argued before the district court that the CC&Rs no longer applied to the 
Land because a First Amendment to the original CC&Rs referred to in the Final Plat 
referred solely to Phase 1 and not to Phase 2.  The PUD was approved by Grantsville 
pursuant to its authority in § 12.2 as a conditional use.  Once approved, the PUD can only 
be amended as required by City ordinances. See § 12.5.  Indeed, only the City Council 
can approve any zoning changes. See UCA § 10-9a-503. The PUD cannot be amended 
simply by the recording of an amended restrictive covenant that has neither been 
reviewed nor approved by the appropriate municipal authorities. Therefore, the district 
court improperly held that the PUD did not apply to anything other than Phase 1 because 
of an amendment to the CC&Rs.  (R. 272–73.) 
In addition, the amendment to the CC&Rs is irrelevant to the PUD requirements 
because CC&Rs are contracts that bind only the participating parties. “Restrictive 
covenants that run with the land and encumber subdivision lots form a contract between 
subdivision property owners as a whole and individual lot owners.” Swensen v. Erickson, 
2000 UT 16, ¶11, 998 P.2d 807. Grantsville was not a party to CC&Rs or the First 
Amendment. Any amendment to the CC&Rs can have no binding effect on the PUD 
process that is established in Grantsville City ordinances. Therefore, the First 
Amendment by itself can have no effect to limit or expand on the property subject to the 
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PUD application submitted to and approved by Grantsville.  Pacific’s action, if one 
exists, on this argument must be made, not to Grantsville, but to all of the property 
owners affected by the alleged change to the CC&Rs, which must necessarily include all 
of the property owners within Phase 1.  Again, the district court improperly held that the 
amendment to the CC&Rs caused the PUD to be applicable only to Phase 1, and its 
decision on this issue must be overturned. 
D. Pacific’s Claim that the Statute of Frauds Renders the Originally 
Approved Plan Inapplicable must Fail. 
Pacific also claims that the design restrictions appearing on the approved 1997 
project plan are unenforceable against the future phases pursuant to the Statute of Frauds. 
Specifically, argues Pacific, those restrictions were not signed by the City or by Pacific’s 
predecessor in interest; they are therefore barred from application by UCA § 25-5-1: 
No estate or interest in real property, other than leases for a term not exceeding 
one year, nor any trust or power over or concerning real property or in any 
manner relating thereto, shall be created, granted, assigned, surrendered or 
declared otherwise than by act or operation of law, or by deed or conveyance 
in writing subscribed by the party creating, granting, assigning, surrendering 
or declaring the same, or by his lawful agent thereunto authorized by writing.10
 
This statute, however, has no bearing on the approved development plans for the Country 
Haven PUD: zoning restrictions, including the parameters of a PUD, apply by action of 
                                                 
10 Below, Pacific cited to Forest Meadow Ranch Prop. Owners Ass’n v. Pine Meadow 
Ranch Home Ass’n, 2005 UT App 294, ¶¶18 & 22, 118 P.3d 871, for the proposition that 
covenants running with the land must be signed by the party creating the restraint. (R. at 
123.) The Utah Supreme Court, however, stripped Forest Meadow of its precedential 
value in Peters v. Pine Meadow Ranch Home Ass’n, 2007 UT 2, ¶23, 151 P.3d 962: 
“[W]e affirm the result reached by the court of appeals in both Forest Meadow and 
Peters, limit the court of appeals' decisions to the facts of each case, and deem the 
decisions to be without precedential effect.” 
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law as delegated by the Utah legislature to Utah’s municipalities. Such laws are not 
subject to the statute of frauds. Citizens are not required to read and execute all land-use 
laws before they take effect. The statute itself excepts use-restriction “by act or operation 
of law”; and, although PUDs are not, in and of themselves, “estates or interests in real 
property,” their creation is certainly “by operation of law,” and therefore expressly 
excepted from the statute. 
 Even if the statute of frauds were controlling, Pacific’s predecessor presented the 
Preliminary Plans (City Ex. 22) and presented and signed the Final Plat (City Ex. 23), and 
these documents contain most of the elements of the Final Development Plan governing 
the development of the future phases of the project. 
CONCLUSION 
 For the forgoing reasons, Grantsville requests that the district court’s decision to 
grant Pacific summary and declaratory judgment be reversed. 
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— ADDENDUM — 
 
 Tab A Relevant Rules, Statutes and City Ordinances 
 
 Tab B Relevant Portions of February 22, 2008 Hearing Transcript 
 
 Tab C Declaratory Judgment, dated May 20, 2008 
 
 Tab D Order on Cross Motions for Summary Judgment, dated May 20, 2008 
 
 Tab E Grantsville City Council Findings and Decisions, dated March 7, 2007 
 
 Tab F Paldevco Ltd. P'ship v. Auburn Hills, 1998 WL 1988569
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DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS 
URCP, Rule 56(c) Summary Judgment. 
* * * * 
 (c)  Motion and proceedings thereon. The motion, memoranda and affidavits shall be 
in accordance with Rule 7. The judgment sought shall be rendered if the pleadings, 
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the 
affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that 
the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. A summary judgment, 
interlocutory in character, may be rendered on the issue of liability alone although 
there is a genuine issue as to the amount of damages. 
* * * * 
 
 
UCA § 10-9a-701 
(1) Each municipality adopting a land use ordinance shall, by ordinance, establish one 
or more appeal authorities to hear and decide: 
(a) requests for variances from the terms of the land use ordinances; and 
(b) appeals from decisions applying the land use ordinances. 
(2) As a condition precedent to judicial review, each adversely affected person shall 
timely and specifically challenge a land use authority's decision, in accordance with 
local ordinance.  
* * * * 
(4) By ordinance, a municipality may: 
(a) designate a separate appeal authority to hear requests for variances than the 
appeal authority it designates to hear appeals; 
(b) designate one or more separate appeal authorities to hear distinct types of 
appeals of land use authority decisions; 
(c) require an adversely affected party to present to an appeal authority every 
theory of relief that it can raise in district court; 
(d) not require an adversely affected party to pursue duplicate or successive 
appeals before the same or separate appeal authorities as a condition of the 
adversely affected party's duty to exhaust administrative remedies; and 
(e) provide that specified types of land use decisions may be appealed directly to 
the district court.  
* * * * 
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UCA § 10-9a-801 
(1)  No person may challenge in district court a municipality's land use decision made 
under this chapter, or under a regulation made under authority of this chapter, until 
that person has exhausted the person's administrative remedies as provided in Part 7, 
Appeal Authority and Variances, if applicable. 
(2)  (a)  Any person adversely affected by a final decision made in the exercise of or in 
violation of the provisions of this chapter may file a petition for review of the 
decision with the district court within 30 days after the local land use decision 
is final. 
* * * * 
(3)  (a)  The courts shall: 
(i)  presume that a decision, ordinance, or regulation made under the 
authority of this chapter is valid; and 
(ii) determine only whether or not the decision, ordinance, or regulation is 
arbitrary, capricious, or illegal. 
(b)  A decision, ordinance, or regulation involving the exercise of legislative 
discretion is valid if it is reasonably debatable that the decision, ordinance, or 
regulation promotes the purposes of this chapter and is not otherwise illegal. 
(c)  A final decision of a land use authority or an appeal authority is valid if the 
decision is supported by substantial evidence in the record and is not arbitrary, 
capricious, or illegal. 
(d)  A determination of illegality requires a determination that the decision, 
ordinance, or regulation violates a law, statute, or ordinance in effect at the 
time the decision was made or the ordinance or regulation adopted. 
* * * * 
(6)  The petition is barred unless it is filed within 30 days after the appeal authority's 
decision is final. 
(7)  (a)  The land use authority or appeal authority, as the case may be, shall transmit to 
the reviewing court the record of its proceedings, including its minutes, 
findings, orders, and, if available, a true and correct transcript of its 
proceedings. 
(b)  If the proceeding was tape recorded, a transcript of that tape recording is a true 
and correct transcript for purposes of this Subsection (7). 
(8)  (a)  (i)  If there is a record, the district court's review is limited to the record 
provided by the land use authority or appeal authority, as the case may 
be. 
(ii)  The court may not accept or consider any evidence outside the record of 
4846-2457-1395.GR058.001 43
the land use authority or appeal authority, as the case may be, unless that 
evidence was offered to the land use authority or appeal authority, 
respectively, and the court determines that it was improperly excluded. 
(b)  If there is no record, the court may call witnesses and take evidence. 
* * * * 
 
 
UCA § 57-3-103 
Each document not recorded as provided in this title is void as against any subsequent 
purchaser of the same real property, or any portion of it, if: 
(1) the subsequent purchaser purchased the property in good faith and for a valuable 
consideration; and 
(2) the subsequent purchaser's document is first duly recorded. 
 
 
UCA § 70A-8-302 
(1) Except as otherwise provided in Subsections (2) and (3), a purchaser of a certificated 
or uncertificated security acquires all rights in the security that the transferor had or 
had power to transfer. 
(2) A purchaser of a limited interest acquires rights only to the extent of the interest 
purchased. 
(3) A purchaser of a certificated security who as a previous holder had notice of an 
adverse claim does not improve its position by taking from a protected purchaser. 
 
 
UCA § 78B-6-401 
(1) Each district court has the power to issue declaratory judgments determining rights, 
status, and other legal relations within its respective jurisdiction. An action or 
proceeding may not be open to objection on the ground that a declaratory judgment 
or decree is prayed for. 
(2) The declaration may be either affirmative or negative in form and effect and shall 
have the force and effect of a final judgment or decree. 
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§ 3.22 APPEALS. 
(1) The applicant or any other person or entity adversely affected by a decision 
administering or interpreting a land use ordinance may appeal that decision applying 
the land use ordinance by alleging that there is error in any order, requirement, 
decision, or determination made by an official in the administration, interpretation, 
or enforcement of the land use ordinance within 30 days of the decision. 
(2) Any officer, department, board, or bureau of Grantsville City affected by the grant, 
or refusal of a building permit or by any other decisions of the zoning administrator 
in the enforcement and administration of the land use ordinance may appeal any 
decision to the board of adjustment. The appellant has the burden of proving that the 
land use authority erred. 
(3) Only decisions applying the ordinance may be appealed to the board of adjustment. 
(4) A person may not appeal, and the Board of Adjustment may not consider, any land 
use ordinance amendments. 
(5) Appeals may not be used to waive or modify the terms or requirements of the land 
use ordinance. 
(6) In making an appeal, an adversely affected party shall present to the appeal authority 
every theory of relief that it can raise in district court.  
 
 
§ 3.24 DUE PROCESS 
(1) Each appeal authority shall conduct each appeal and variance request as provided in 
local ordinance. 
(2) Each appeal authority shall respect the due process rights of each of the participants. 
 
 
§ 7.8  Determination. (Amended 6/00) 
(1) The Planning Commission, or upon authorization, the Zoning Administrator, may 
permit a use to be located within a zoning district in which a conditional use permit 
is required by the use regulations of that zoning district or elsewhere in these 
ordinances. The Zoning Administrator is also authorized to issue conditional use 
permits for family food production and the raising of horses in the R-1-21 and RM-7 
zoning districts, when appropriate, but may also defer any such application to the 
Planning Commission for its determination, in the sole discretion of the Zoning 
Administrator. In authorizing any conditional use the Planning Commission or 
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Zoning Administrator shall impose such requirements and conditions as are 
necessary for the protection of adjacent properties and the public welfare. The 
Planning Commission or Zoning Administrator shall only approve with conditions, 
or deny a conditional use based upon written findings of fact with regard to each of 
the standards set forth below and, where applicable, any special standards for 
conditional uses set forth in a specific zoning district. The Planning Commission or 
Zoning Administrator shall not authorize a conditional use permit unless the 
evidence presented is such as to establish:  
(a) The proposed use is one of the conditional uses specifically listed in the zoning 
district in which it is to be located; 
(b) That such use will not, under the circumstances of the particular case, be 
detrimental to the health, safety, comfort, order or general welfare of persons 
residing or working in the vicinity; 
(c) That the use will comply with the intent, spirit, and regulations of these 
ordinances and is compatible with and implements the planning goals and 
objectives of the City, including applicable City master plans; 
(d) Make the use harmonious with the neighboring uses in the zoning district in 
which it is to be located; 
(e) That nuisances which would not be in harmony with the neighboring uses, will 
be abated by the conditions imposed; 
(f) That protection of property values, the environment, and the tax base for 
Grantsville City will be assured; 
(g) That the conditions shall be in compliance with the current comprehensive 
General Plan of Grantsville City; 
(h) That some form of a guarantee is made assuring compliance to all conditions 
that are imposed;  
(i) That the conditions imposed are not capricious, arbitrary or contrary to any 
precedence set by the Planning Commission on prior permits, which are similar 
in use and district, unless prior approvals were not in accordance with the 
provisions and standards of this ordinance; 
(j) The internal circulation system of the proposed development is properly 
designed; 
(k) Existing and proposed utility services are adequate for the proposed 
development; 
(l) Appropriate buffering is provided to protect adjacent land uses from light, 
noise and visual impacts; 
(m) Architecture and building materials are consistent with the development and 
compatible with the adjacent neighborhood; 
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(n) Landscaping is appropriate for the scale of the development; 
(o) The proposed use preserves historical, architectural and environmental features 
of the property; and 
(p) Operating and delivery hours are compatible with adjacent land uses. 
 
 
§ 12.1 Purpose. (Amended 11/97) 
(1) A planned development is a distinct category of conditional use. As such, it is 
intended to encourage the efficient use of land and resources, promote greater 
efficiency in public and utility services, preservation of open space, efficient use of 
alternative transportation and encouraging innovation in the planning and building 
of all types of development. Through the flexibility of the planned unit development 
technique, the City and developer will seek to achieve one or more of the following 
specific objectives: 
(a) Creation of a more desirable environment than would be possible through strict 
application of other City land use regulations: 
(b) Promotion of a creative approach to the use of land and related physical 
facilities resulting in better design and development, including aesthetic 
amenities; 
I Combination and coordination of architectural styles, building forms and 
building relationships; 
(d) The creation, landscaping and preservation of open space and recreational 
facilities; 
(e) Preservation and enhancement of desirable site characteristics such as natural 
topography, vegetation and geologic features, and the prevention of soil 
erosion; 
(f) Use of design, landscape or architectural features to create a pleasing 
environment; 
(g) Preservation of buildings which are architecturally or historically significant 
contribute to the character of the City; 
(h) Establishment of interconnecting paths and trails for alternative transportation 
routes which lead to common and popular destinations and  interface with 
automobile traffic at few and specific points; 
(i) Provision of a variety of housing, in accordance with the City’s general plans; 
(j) Promote infill development into the core of the City; 
(k) Inclusion of special development features; and 
(l) Elimination of blighted structures or incompatible uses through redevelopment 
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or rehabilitation. 
 
 
§ 12.2 Authority to Modify Regulations. (Amended 11/97) 
(1) The Planning Commission shall have the authority in approving any planned 
development to change, alter, modify or waive any provisions of this Code as they 
apply to the proposed planned development. No such change, alteration, 
modification or waiver shall be approved unless the Planning Commission shall find 
that the proposed planned unit development: 
(a) Will achieve one or more the purposes for which a planned development may 
be approved pursuant to Section 12.1; and all of the applicable standards of 
Section 7.8 have been met to the satisfaction of the Planning Commission. 
(b) Will not violate the general purposes, goals and objectives of this Code and of 
any plans adopted by the Planning Commission or the City Council. 
(2) No change, alteration, modification or waiver authorized by this Section shall 
authorize a change in the uses permitted in any district, a modification with respect 
to any standard established by this Chapter or a modification with respect to any 
standard in a zoning district made specifically applicable to planned developments, 
unless such regulations expressly authorize such a change, alteration, modification 
or waiver. 
 
 
§ 12.3 Minimum Area. (Amended 4/97, 4/00) 
(1) A planned development proposed for any parcel or tract of land under single 
ownership or control shall have a contiguous minimum net site area for each zoning 
district as set forth below: 
Minimum Planned Zoning District    Development Size 
Agriculture District, A       80 Acres 
Rural Residential District, RR-5     20 Acres 
Rural Residential District, RR-1     10 Acres 
Residential District R-1-21      10 Acres 
Residential District, R-1-12      5 Acres 
Multiple Residential District, RM-7  (Amended 4/97) 7000 Square Feet 
Multiple Residential District, RM-15    5 Acres 
Neighborhood Commercial District, C-N   20,000 Square Feet 
Shopping Commercial District, C-S    60,000 Square Feet 
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General Commercial District, C-G     2 Acres 
Light Manufacturing and Distribution District, M-D 5 Acres 
General Manufacturing District, M-G    5 Acres 
Central Business District, D-1     20,000 Square Feet 
Downtown Support District, D-2     40,000 Square Feet 
Sensitive Area District, S-A      10 Acres 
(2) Not withstanding any provision herein to the contrary, any lot or parcel legally 
created or existing as of the effective date of this Code (July 15, 1996), that is 
currently located in a commercial or industrial zoning district, may in the discretion 
of the Planning Commission and City Council, be developed as a Planned Unit 
Development, even if said lot or parcel does not contain the above stated minimum 
net site area, provided said development is determined to comply with the other 
requirements of this Chapter. (Amended 4/00) 
 
 
§ 12.4 Application Procedure. (Amended 98, 11/99) 
(1) Except as required by this section, the application and approval procedures for 
planned unit developments are the same as is specified in the Subdivision 
Regulations contained in Section 2 of Chapter 21 of this Code. Planned unit 
developments shall also comply with the other provisions of Chapter 21, where 
applicable, including design standards for subdivision. Applications for a planned 
unit development concept shall be filed with the City at least 21 days prior to the 
Planning Commission meeting where it will first be considered. 
(2) In addition to the application requirements for subdivisions, an applicant for a 
planned unit development shall submit the following information with the concept 
plan application: 
(a) At the concept phase, the applicant shall submit a written statement addressing 
each of the standards set forth in Section 7.8 herein entitled, Determination, 
when applicable and how the proposed development will promote the 
objectives set forth in Section 12.1 of this Chapter. The statement shall explain 
specifically how the proposed planned unit development relates to each such 
standard and promotes a listed objective;  (Amended 11/99) 
(b) At the preliminary phase, the applicant shall submit a written statement 
indicating specifically what change, alteration, modification or waiver of any 
zoning or development regulation is being sought by the developer, if any. 
(Amended 11/99) 
(3) The Chairman of the Planning Commission in consultation with the Zoning 
Administrator or the Planning Commission itself may set a public hearing regarding 
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any proposed planned unit development, prior to considering an application or at any 
time prior to final approval of the development by the Planning Commission. If a 
public hearing is set on a proposed planned unit development, written notice to 
adjoining property owners shall be required in addition to the regular notice placed 
in the local newspaper. The chairman of the Planning Commission or the Planning 
Commission itself may specify that written notice be given to property owners 
beyond adjoining property owners. The applicant shall be responsible for all of the 
costs incurred by the City to provide written and published notice of any such public 
hearing.  
(4) The Final Plat approval shall include approval of the final development plan and all 
special conditions applicable to the planned unit development. The Final Plat 
together with the final development plan and special conditions for the planned unit 
development, rather than any other provision of this Ordinance, shall constitute the 
use, parking. loading, sign, bulk, space and yard regulations applicable to the subject 
property, and no use or development, other than a home occupation or temporary 
uses, not allowed by the Final Plat and development plan and conditions shall be 
permitted within the area of the planned unit development. The Final Plat shall 
include a notation of any changes, alterations, modifications or waivers of the 
regular standards of the zoning district and shall list any special conditions. 
(5) (Amended 98) Any party aggrieved by the final decision of the Planning 
Commission, with respect to a Concept Phase, Preliminary Phase or Final Plat and 
Development Plan regarding a planned unit development, may appeal such decision 
to the City Council, whose decision shall then be final. All appeals to the City 
Council must be in writing and filed with the Zoning Administrator within thirty 
(30) days of the date of the decision appealed from and prior to any further 
consideration by the Planning Commission of a subsequent step in the planned unit 
development approval process. Only the final decision of the City Council with 
respect to the Final Plat and Development Plan may be appealed to the District 
Court, provided such appeal is filed within thirty (30) days of the decision of the 
City Council. Said appeal shall be filed with the City Recorder and with the Clerk of 
the District Court. No planned unit development permit shall be valid for a period 
longer than one year unless a building permit has been issued, construction has 
actually begun within that period and construction has been diligently pursued. 
Upon written request of the applicant, the one year period may be extended by the 
Planning Commission for such time as it shall determine for good cause shown, 
without further hearing. 
 
 
§ 12.5 Adjustments to Development Plan. 
(1) No alteration or amendment shall be made in the construction, development or use 
without a new application under the provisions of this Code. However, minor 
alterations may be made subject to written approval of the Planning Commission 
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and the date for completion may be extended by the Planning Commission. During 
the build-out of the planned unit development, the Planning Commission may 
authorize minor adjustments to the approved Final Development Plan pursuant to the 
provisions for modifications to an approved site plan, when such adjustments appear 
necessary in light of technical or engineering considerations. Such minor 
adjustments shall be limited to the following elements: 
 (a) Adjusting the distance as shown on the approved final Development Plan 
between any one structure or group of structures, and any other structure or group of 
structures, or any vehicular circulation element or any boundary of the site; 
 (b) Adjusting the location of any open space. The size or amount of open space 
that was approved shall not be compromised. 
 (c) Adjusting any final grade, and 
(d) Altering the types of landscaping elements and their arrangement within the 
required landscaping buffer area. 
(2) Such minor adjustments shall be consistent with the intent and purpose of the Code 
and the Final Development Plan as approved pursuant to this Section, and shall be 
the minimum necessary to overcome the particular difficulty and shall not be 
approved if such adjustments would result in a violation of any standard or 
requirement of this Code.  
(3) Any adjustment to the approved Final Development Plan not authorized by this 
Section, shall be considered to be a major adjustment. The Planning Commission 
following notice to at least all adjoining property owners, may approve an 
application for a major adjustment of the Final Development Plan, not requiring a 
modification of written conditions of approval or recorded easements, upon finding 
that any changes in the plan as approved will be in substantial conformity to the final 
Development Plan. If the Planning Commission determines that a major adjustment 
is not in substantial conformity with the Final Development Plan as approved, then 
the Planning Commission shall review the request in accordance with the procedures 
set forth in Section 12.4. 
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